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Book Review
ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREVIE COURT.

By Paul A.

Freund. Boston. Little, Brown and Company, Pp. X, 130.
$3.00.
This book originated from a series of three lectures
delivered as the Rosenthal Foundation lectures at the Law
School of Northwestern University in April 1949. The
author, Professor of Law at Harvard University, has added
an introduction and notes. The result is a very readable,
yet documented, analysis of the Supreme Court in action
with an excellent chapter on Mr. Justice Brandeis describing the role played by such a justice.
Chapter I, "Concord and Discord," is introduced with
the suggestion of Alfred North Whitehead "that the key
to a science of values will be found in aesthetics" and "that
the Supreme Court is seeking the aesthetic satisfaction of
bringing the constitution into harmony with the activities
of modern America". After a brief suggestion as to the
philosophical problem of the Court in reconciling "the One
and the Many; one nation and many states; one Supreme
Court and many organs of government; one Court speaking
with many, often disconcertingly many voices," the author
settles down to a discussion of the Court's recently rapidly
expanded development of the constitutional protection
afforded in the field of civil liberties, of "human rights contrasted with property rights". The author concludes that
"the degree of concord in this area is much more important
than the degree of discord, and that the themes of discord
are not ... symmetrical". His support for this conclusion
is a brief, interesting, and illuminating portrayal of much
of what the Court has been doing in recent years and
how it is controlled by (as well as controls in part) the
framework of democratic government within which it
operates.
Chapter II, "Portrait of a Liberal Judge: Mr. Justice
Brandeis," is a careful study of this Justice by a former
Secretary who had opportunity to know him intimately.
Suggesting that Mr. Justice Brandeis' liberalism as a judge
lay "in an essential morality of mind" which quality was
"his essential and enduring contribution to the Court",
the author finds four principal manifestations of this quality: "(1) an insistence on knowledge as indispensable to
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judging; (2) rejection of opportunism; (3) an insistence
on jurisdictional and procedural observances; and (4) rejection of sentimentality". The first manifestation is reflected in the Brandeis brief and a similar approach to
problems before the Court. The second is developed from
several illustrations and the author's personal conviction
that Justice Brandeis did not in his opinions espouse his
personal evaluations of business practices or social cures
except when in "elucidation of legislation which he was
glad to accept". The third is illustrated by: his devotion to
the federal principle in his opinion in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins'; his rejection of nationalization of rules of procedure for the federal courts; his stand against declaratory
judgments as applied to the determination of constitutional
questions; his forbearance when sitting in judgment on
administrative determinations but insistence upon their
observance of procedural guarantees; his further insistence
that procedures for challenging administrative orders be
adequate; and his pervading concern with the fitness of
the members of the body politic for their respective tasks,
legislatures, administrative boards, and courts. The fourth
manifestation is illustrated by cases pointing to the fact
that as in all great judges his sentiments of affection yielded
to devotion to the larger cause, that his sense of "institutional solidarity for the court was stronger than his attachment to anyone of his colleagues, even to Holmes", and
that his opinions were "uniformly addressed to problems
and not to persons".
Chapter III, " 'Judge and Company' In Constitutional
Law" starts with the thought that in relation to the quotation from Jeremy Bentham, the "Company" who share
the lawmaking activity of Supreme Court judges include
at least the lower tribunals as well as counsel. After brief
discussion of the part played by "strong" courts, the author
turns to analysis of the shaping of constitutional litigation
by the strategy and tactics of counsel. He moves from
illustrations from the cases argued by Daniel Webster,
which demonstrate his tremendous influence as advocate,
to the more recent instances of planned litigation from the
Attorney General's office, the federal agencies, or from private counsel for large industrial groups. The TVA cases, the
Holding Company litigation, the Gold Clause cases, intergovernmental tax immunity cases and others are discussed.
The responsibility of counsel is heavily emphasized. The
chapter concludes with two important practical implica1304 U. S. 64 (1938).
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tions from the Supreme Court's recent reluctance to declare
state laws unconstitutional under the due process clause
unless basic liberties are involved: (1) that constitutional
litigation over state laws will be concentrated more and
more in state courts with state constitutional law becoming
of dominent importance, and (2) that in the field of
federal legislation, the constitutional issues may be transferred from the judicial to the legislative stage, with the
constitutional lawyer's function being discharged more
frequently before Congressional committees than in court.
The book is recommended reading for those who are
interested in understanding the Supreme Court during this
new transition period of its history.
G. KENETH REIBLICH*
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

